Journal of Technology Law & Policy
Volume 8

Issue 1

Article 2

June 2003

Subsidies Code, Trips Agreement, and Technological
Development: Some Consideration for Developing Countries
Irene Ribeiro Dubowy

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jtlp

Recommended Citation
Dubowy, Irene Ribeiro (2003) "Subsidies Code, Trips Agreement, and Technological Development: Some
Consideration for Developing Countries," Journal of Technology Law & Policy: Vol. 8: Iss. 1, Article 2.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jtlp/vol8/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Technology Law & Policy by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

SUBSIDIES CODE, TRIPS AGREEMENT, AND
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT: SOME CONSIDERATIONS
FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Irene Ribeiro Dubowy °
I.

INTRODUCTION ......................................

II.

INFORMATION AGE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

III.

R&D SUBSIDIES AND COMPETITION IN THE

34
..........

37

INFORMATION AGE ...................................

IV.

THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE

SCM AGREEMENT AND ITS IMPACT
40

ON INFORMATION ECONOMIES ..........................
V.

COMPETING IN THE INFORMATION AGE: WHAT THE
AGREEMENT DOES AND DOES NOT Do ...................

A.
B.

VI.

36

TRIPS

46
Background of the TRIPS Agreement ...............
46
FosteringTechnology in Developing Countries:
Before andAfter the TRIPS Agreement: What Changed
Since the Draft Code of Conduct in
Technology Transfer ............................
51

COMPETING IN THE INFORMATION AGE:

53
An HistoricalOverview: Before and After the 1980s ... 55

THE U.S. EXAMPLE ...................................

A.

B.
VII.

The Shift in the US. InternationalPosition:
Impact of HistoricalChanges .....................

59

PUTTING THE BRAZILIAN BILL, LEI DE INOVACAO, IN

INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT .............................

VIII. CONCLUSION ........................................

62
65

To contact the author: d287@nyu.edu, idubowy@hnrlaw.com, (212) 942-6689, (315)
727-6352, and (212) 689-8808.
*

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 8

I. INTRODUCTION

As technology continues to develop, so does the importance of
intellectual property (IP) in the balance of trade. As a result of this newfound focus on IP many developed countries welcomed the discussion of
procurement and protection of innovation. The Uruguay Round of
Negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO) produced a new
agreement representing a two-fold achievement: first, the agreement
devised a system of enforcing international IP rights;' second, it addressed
some concerns within the developing countries, namely, the strengthening
of their technological basis.2
In this Article, I will discuss the possibilities and limits for developing
countries to achieve technological development within the parameters set
by both the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement
(TRIPS Agreement) 3 and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (SCM Agreement).4 Both agreements are integral parts of the
WTO Agreement. The new standards laid out in the TRIPS Agreement
and the SCM Agreement are still only in a test phase. There are
innumerable questions dealing with the application of these international
instruments and their limits. From a nation's sovereign right to refuse to
enforce public health patents,6 to the balance of national interests towards

1. See generally Rochelle Dreyfuss & Andreas Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the
UruguayRound: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 275 (1997).
2. See Pedro Roffe & Taffere Tesfachew, The UnfinishedAgenda, in INTERNATIONAL
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, 381, 395 (Kluwer Law International ed., 2000) (noting that issues such
as compulsory license and know-how were also the object of discussion in the TRIPS Agreement).
3. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
4. Id. I will discuss the SCM Agreement to the extent that relates to the overall theme of
this Article, mainly, the question of whether federal sponsored research violates the SCM
Agreement. WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 16, 2002, arts. 8.2,
31 [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
5. Therefore, if a country wants to belong to the WTO it cannot make reservation to such
agreement, with few exceptions. See WTO Agreement, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vols. 31, 33, I.L.M. 81 (1994) art. 72 [hereinafter TRIPS].
6. Tina Rosenberg, Look at Brazil: Patent Laws are Malleable. Patients are Educable.
Drug Companiesare Vincible. The World's AIDS Crisis is Solvable, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 28,
2001; see also WTO Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health, cl. 4,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2, Dec. 14, 2001, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen-search.asp
(last visited May 1, 2003) [hereinafter WTO Doha Declaration].
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members
from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and
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IP protection and the promotion of technology,7 there are still many gaps
to be filled in order to shape the international system of IP.8
In this Article, I will argue that developing countries, eager to develop
their own technological base, should consider the decentralized U.S. model
of Research and Development (R&D). This generally successful model
looks at commercializing inventions made by institutions directly or
indirectly connected to the government. Its adoption, however, should be
pursued with caution, since the U.S. system of innovative procurement may
be actionable under the WTO via SCM Agreement provisions, which deal
with subsidized R&D. 9
In order to draw the necessary commitment from developing and
developed countries, policymakers should interpret the TRIPS Agreement
and the SCM Agreement with the goal of balancing private property rights
with the power of a nation to implement its core economic and health
policies.'° With the liberalizing of national borders towards foreign goods
and services, policymakers around the world struggle to devise a system
which can strengthen the technological basis of a nation, thereby serving as
a legitimate way to compete internationally. Upon analyzing the U.S.

should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO
Members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all.
Id.
7. TRIPS art. 7:
Objectives: The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
8. See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1896, revised at Berlin, Nov. 13, 1908, at Rome, June 2, 1928, at Brussels, June 26, 1948, at
Stockholm, July 14, 1967, at.Paris, July 24, 1971, and amended on Sept. 28, 1979 [hereinafter
Berne Convention]; see also International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of
Mar. 20, 1883, as revised at Brussels on Dec. 14, 1900, at Washington on June 2, 1911, at the
Hague on Nov. 6, 1925, at London on June 2, 1934, at Lisbon on Oct. 31, 1958, and at Stockholm
on July 14, 1967. Both treaties are still very important, being incorporated by references into the
TRIPS Agreement; however, the TRIPS Agreement in a single body of law with wide membership,
introduced greater harmonization, and mostly important, mechanisms of enforcement for the rights
granted than either of these previous treaties.
9. SCM Agreement arts. 8.2, 31.
10. See, e.g., TRIPS arts. 7, 8.1, 8.2, 27, 41.
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experience, I will argue that a similar system should be implemented in
Brazil," where similar legislation is being considered, thus avoiding the
pitfalls of illegal subsidies.
II. INFORMATION AGE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

In the post-industrial information age, intangible goods such as trade
secrets, patents, copyrights, and trademarks have become one's most
valuable property. 2 This type of intangible property is protected by an IP
system, which continuously evolves to reflect increasing economical
importance. 3 Robert Verzola illustrates the economic relevance of
information driven products and the disparity between information intensive
products and information-extensive products. Verzola 14 offers the example
of the price
of a CDROM which might sell for $300, but whose production cost
is around $3, and a typical Philippine product like sugar, which
might sell for 15¢ per pound. Much of the $300 in the price of 2,000
pounds of sugar would barely cover the cost of production, while
much of the $300 in the price of a CDROM would be profit.
Royalties from intellectual property rights [and] other income from
information renters assume major [significance].
Although comparing sugar to CD/ROMs is not absolutely fair since the
value extracted from royalties reflects also the high initial investment in

11. See Ante-Projeto de Lei de Inovacao Cientifica, P.S.L. 257/2001, at Di~rio do Senado
Federal Brasileiro (Dec. 1, 2000), No. 23631-34, available at http://www.senado.gov.br/web/
cegraf/pdf/30112000/23631.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2003). This bill, in discussion in the
Brazilian Congress, devises a system of subsidies.to technological innovation, borrowing concepts
advanced by the Bayh-Dole Act and Stevenson-Wydler Act.
12. See Thomas McCarthy, Intellectual Property- America's Overlooked Export, 20 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 809, 811 (1995). McCarthy argues that the IP export has become one of the few
bright spots in the otherwise dreary U.S. balance-of-trade picture. Among the justifications of a
strong international IP protection, he argues that because "we cannot compete in a world market
for producing steel or clothes or VCRs when manufacturers in developing nations can pay what
we would regard as a less than living wage." Id at 814.
13. E.g., GRAEME DiNWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND
POLICY 708-09 (2001) (discussing the European Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases,
that, undoubtedly, extended the scope of IP rights).
14. Roberto Verzola, Cyberlordsandthe PhilippineGreens, in SYNTHESiS/REGENERATION
(1998).
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R&D, nonetheless the information intensive products obtain the higher rate
of return when compared to commodities, such as sugar.
It has long been a strategy of developing countries to devise a way out
of underdevelopment by absorbing technology from the North. This
strategy was embodied in the negotiations of a Draft Code of Conduct of
International Technology Transfer, 5 which will be the subject of some
discussion in this Article. Ten years of negotiations did not result in a final
agreement. Nevertheless, the Draft Code remains a valuable reference
source towards achieving technological development in developing
countries. This in turn presents concerns of the Group of 77,16 partially
acknowledged in the Uruguay Round of Negotiations.
III. R&D SUBSIDIES AND COMPETITION IN THE INFORMATION AGE
The TRIPS Agreement brought both developed and developing
countries together and established a basic framework of free competition
by balancing legal incentives to create against public interest in free
competition. 17 In the developed countries, there is a growing appetite
favoring a high-protectionist bias for creators and investors, with a
concomitant stifling of pro-consumer and pro-competitive voices." New sui
generis rights such as protection for patent databases, computer programs,
and plant varieties are flourishing in developed countries.' 9 According to
Reichman, part of the reason for this tendency is:

15. PROPOSED DRAFTS OF

INTERNATIONAL

TECHNOLOGY

TRANSFER,

reprinted in

INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: THE ORIGINS AND AFTERMATH OF THE UNITED NATIONS

NEGOTIATIONS ON A DRAFT CODE OF CONDUCT, ANNEx

II (Kluwer Law International ed., 2000).

16. Carlos B. Aguirre, The Latin American Policies, in INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER, supra note 15.
17: J.H. Reichman, Global Competition and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), in INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 15,
at 351.
18. See id. at 353; see also Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and
Biopiracy in the (Not-So-Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual Property
Protection, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11 (1998) (arguing that the tragedy of anticommons
(to many people with the right to exclude) can lead to an underutilization of IP. Arguing that the
intellectual public trust doctrine is being annihilated by theories such as doctrine of equivalents,
or broader scope of patentable subject matter).
19. See also European Trademark Directive, Dec. 21, 1988, (89/104/EEC) art. 7; Zino
Davidoffv. A&G, 2002 E.T.M.R. (E.C.J. 2001) (denying the doctrine of international exhaustion
between the European Union and the rest of the world).
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[a defensive] mentality that tends to view national innovation policy
in terms of preserving the dominant position of existing technology
exporting firms. [By] combining the market power of natural
competitors with strengthened international intellectual property
protection, oligopolists in developed countries seek to make it
harder for firms in developing countries to gain access to the most
valuable technologies or to catch up with the leaders in the global
market for higher-tech products."
Although the TRIPS Agreement tries to cutback free riders, in practice
different national innovation strategies will lead to varied interpretations of
the TRIPS Agreement. This could, in turn, produce a spectrum of choices
in answering the problem of free riding. In this tone, free riding by some
countries may be an efficient choice since the net result will be the increase
in world wealth. Although application of the TRIPS Agreement diminishes
the possibilities of free riding drastically by adopting minimum standards,
it is nonetheless possible to interpret the TRIPS Agreement as allowing
developing countries to "catchup" to the developed world's state of art.
Japan and the United States have had very relaxed IP policies in the past,
which helped foster the development oftechnology while investments were
scarce, further allowing these countries to level the playing field with their
European counterparts.
Although not every relaxed system will lead to technological innovation,
it is also unlikely that a strict system, absent other incentives, will lead to
technological innovation either. Brazil's worst trade deficit is in the area of
microelectronics. In 2002, the deficit was around $7.6 billion. Only in
semiconductors, have Brazil's imports been worth a surplus of $820
million. By contrast, South Korea's 2 1 technological adaptation, acted as a
jump-starter for progress in areas of basic research and technological
innovation.
In South Korea's first stage of adaptation, the program of technological
innovation was geared towards adapting technologies and fostering an
ample and vigorous educational effort. Recently, South Korea has also
become geared to basic research, after becoming conscious that without

20. Reichman, supra note 17, at 355.
21. See Nicolas Gikkas, InternationalLicensing ofIntellectual Property: The Promiseand
Peril, I J.TECH. L. & POL'Y 6 (1996) (arguing that free riding is sponsored theft by state, offering
the example of Korea which, among other nations, used free riding to constitute its high tech
industrial base).
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advancements in research, there is nothing to afford a competitive edge.22
While some scholars have argued that free riding does not solve the longterm problems of underdevelopment, free riding may be positive in terms
of leveling the playing field if a country has a focused technological
innovation program.
Developing countries suffer from inadequate technical capacity and a
lack of capital investments. At the same time, developing countries are left
to devise a system of innovation which can improve their competitive
profile. This is accomplished by acquiring and absorbing technical and
scientific knowledge while attempting to comply with the TRIPS
Agreement. Reichman suggests that developing countries should maneuver
in areas that allow for broad interpretation, the so-called gray areas23 of the
TRIPS Agreement. For example, Brazil should go around the limits of
TRIPS and take advantage of the entire European Patent Database, which
it has had full access to since 2002,24 and promote a stricter prior art
review. Reichman argues that developing countries should take the role of
fostering competition and asserting the right to compete on fair and equal
terms in a global market.25
The TRIPS Agreement, however, is not the only obstacle of developing
countries in the information age. The SCM Agreement also operates as a
barrier for governments interested in subsidizing R&D. Although the initial
provisions of the SCM Agreement provided a large leeway in terms of
governmental R&D, those provisions expired in 1999, and the current state
of law may jeopardize the efforts of developing and developed countries as
they try to foster technological innovation.

22. Ronaldo Mota Sardemberg, Conhecimento: a vertente essencial (Revista Exame Mar.
17,2003), availableathttp://www.mct.gov.br/comunicacao/textos/default.asp?codtipo=2&cod_
texto= 1882 (last visited Mar. 17, 2003) [Portuguese].
23. J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to FairFollowers: Global Competition under the
TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. INT'L L. & POL. 11 (arguing that higher standards of nonobviousness, or prior art could be enforced still within TRIPS compliance).
24. Valor Econ6mico, Feb. 26, 2002, INPI Firma Acordo para Implementar Base
Tecnol6gica,availableathttp://www.mct.gov.br/sobre/nanidia/CTnamidia/2002/26_02c.htm (last
visited Mar. 17, 2003) (article in a Brazilian Newspaper, announcing a partnership between the
European Patent Office and the Brazilian Patent Office in which the European Patent Office made
available the entire patent database (over 90 million documents) in its digitized form. The
Brazilian Patent Office has in turn made available the Brazilian digitized database since 1982.).
25. J.H. Reichman, supra note 17, at 362 (stating the "real question is not whether these
countries can compete, even in markets for technological and information goods, but whether the
developed countries still have the stomach for stiff global competition once it becomes a legal and
economic reality").
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IV. THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE SCM AGREEMENT AND
ITS IMPACT ON INFORMATION ECONOMIES

As the prices of commodities-go down, and the prices of information
intensive products go up, countries shift their focus on more technology
intensive products. EMBRAER, a Brazilian aviation company is now one
of Brazil's leading exports, with sales around $2.6 billion yearly. In a fierce
information intensive markets, governments are major players. The battle
between Canada (Bombardier) vs. Brazil (EMBRAER) over the market for
small to middle sized aircrafts has presented the WTO Panels with the
difficult task of carving certain guidelines for government participation in
international markets. Brazil was condemned to pay over $1.4 billion in
trade sanctions over 6 years for having subsidized interest rates, which were
incurred by buyers of Brazilian aircrafts.26 Brazil retaliated and argued that
Technology Partnerships Canada (TCP), a program designed to foster
technological development in the Canadian industry, was also an export
subsidy. The WTO Panel found that the Canadian program violated Article
3.1 (a) of the SCM Agreement based on the propensity of the Canadian
aircraft industry to export and because grants towards TCP were given
relatively near commercial exploitation. Canada argued that the decision to
consider a propensity to export as a proxy to find an export subsidy
destroyed the framework of amber light domestic subsidies and certain
green light subsidies (allowed in August 1999) by converting them into red
light subsidies." The dispute between Brazil and Canada is an example of
the disputes that may arise as countries embark upon a path to economic
prosperity that is dependent on information driven export industries and
WTO Panel decisions, which may have drastic consequences in R&D
policymaking.
In this section, I will discuss the relationship that emerges between the
TRIPS Agreement and the SCM Agreement, both integral parts of the

26. WTO Report of Appellate Body, Brazil Export Financing For Aircraft, Aug. 2, 1999
(WT/DS46/AB/R). Brazil argued that the interest rates subsidization did not materially advantage
Embraer, but only off-set the "risk Brazil" of sovereign default, reflected by extremely high
interest rates. The Appellate Body of WTO held although it was ready to find that the material
advantage could not be treated as simply "leveling the playing field," in the present case Brazil
had not met its burden of proof of denying the effect of the interest rates as a material
subsidization. Id. at
15, 181-84.
27. See infra notes 38-40; Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
Canada/Brazil WTO Panels - Aircraft, available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/air_
appeal-e.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2003).
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WTO framework.28 The negotiations at Uruguay resulted in linking the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) enforcement procedures
(e.g., denial of most favored nation treatment, countervailing duties)
requiring country-members to harmonize their system of IP protection. In
doing so, they created a connection of different agreements to modify the
general enforcement procedures, thereby creating a legal interdependence
of SCM and TRIPs. We will focus on the interdependence between the
TRIPS Agreement and the SCM Agreement.
We now turn to the analysis of the role of federally funded R&D
programs in the U.S. economy,29 and its interplay with the SCM
Agreement. The TRIPS Agreement interacts with the SCM Agreement and
vice versa in various ways. If a patent is issued in a country where all the
costs are subsidized by the government, the rights will balance in favor of
the patented product to remain in the public domain since the reward
justification for the patent will be lost. We are also aware, however that
subsidizing R&D has been proven an efficient way of achieving economic
prosperity, therefore triggering considerations in Article 7 of the TRIPS
Agreement, which deals with IP and technological innovation.
The United States, since the 1980s, adopted a very determined policy
of fostering technological innovation. This is partly based on the notion that
the United States could not solve the insistent balance of payment deficits
without the help of its brighter trade figure: the IP export.30 In 1999, the
U.S. expenditures in R&D were on the order of $247 billion. The
government was responsible for $65.8 billion, or 26.6%.3' Since 1994, the
government decreased its funding for industrial research, although
remaining quite expressive. 32 Although unclear, one reason the United
States decreased its funding could be the apprehension that such funds may
be classified as an unlawful subsidy in the future. Notwithstanding

28. Accordingly, it is not possible to be a WTO country and have most favored nation
treatment if the country did not sign both agreements.
29. The United States is the object of this Article, which does not mean that other developed
countries like Germany and Japan do not carry similar programs. According to the 2002 World
Development Indicators of the World Bank, 22 leading industrialized countries are spending 2.5-'
3% of their GNP on R&D. 2002 World Development Indicators of the World Bank, available at
http://www.undp.org/ (last visited May 1, 2003) (on file with author).
30. See McCarthy, supra note 12.
31. National Science Foundation, National Expenditures for R&D: Performance by Sector,
Subdivided by Sources of Funds: 1992-1999, availableat http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/nsf00306/
tables/tb I a.xls (last visited Apr. 26, 2002).
32. See National Science Foundation, Trends in Industrial R&D Performance, by Source of
Funds, in Current and in Constant Dollars: 1953-98, available at http://caspar.nsf.gov/nsf/srs/
IndRD/NSF%2001%2D305/A-l.xls (last visited Mar. 17, 2003).

JOURNAL OFTECHNOLOGY LAW& POLICY

[Vol. 8

government sponsored R&D remains very important in the United States.
For example, in 1994 the United States spent $85 billion in R&D. During
the same period, Japan, a country that had spent second most in R&D, had
invested merely $10 billion.33
The massive investment that the U.S. government provided for R&D
reflects its economic policy to prioritize investments in areas with the
potential to diminish trade deficits. In 1994, during the Uruguay Round
negotiations of the Dunkel Text, the United States voiced its concerns that
the government would be impeded from carrying previously approved
programs, if the text passed in its proposed form. Before analyzing the
problem associated with the Dunkel text, it may be worth it to step back
and review the general framework of the SCM Agreement.
[The] WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(SCM agreement)34 deals with government subsidization.
Subsidization occurs when the government gives the producer an
advantage in the market place. This support may, in turn, negatively
affect other countries' industries and trade. The objective of the
Agreement is to curb the use of such government assistance.35
The SCM Agreement applies to industrial products and agricultural
products, to some extent. The SCM Agreement defines which types of
subsidies distort trade.36 According to the SCM Agreement, the most
distorting subsidies are those intending to promote exports or displace
imports, or those given to specific industries. If a country illegally
subsidizes an industry, the affected country can take trade measures
(countervailing duties) unilaterally to offset the injury, or it can resort to the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body to seek the discontinuation of the subsidy
program.

33. The GAT Subsidies Code and Its Impact on Research and Development in the U.S.:
Hearing on H.R. Before the Committee on Science, Space & Technology, 101st Cong. (1994)
(testimony of Richard K. Quisemberry, Ph.D. (Apr. 21, 1994)); see also MICHAEL P. RYAN,
KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY 2 (1998). Ryan points out that in 1992 around 45% of all industrial
R&D in the industrialized countries was carried out in the United States, and that U.S.-based
inventors earned about 45% of patents granted by the U.S.P.T.O. and 25% of the European Patent
Office. Id. at 2.
34. WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legale/24-scm.pdf(last visited Apr. 4, 2003) [hereinafter
SCM Agreement].
35. Department of Finance of Canada, SubsidiesandCountervailingMeasuresInformation
Paper,available at http://www.fin.gc.ca/activty/pubs/Sub-e.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
36. SCM Agreement, supranote 35, art. 1.

20031
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The SCM Agreement defines three types of subsidies: red light
subsidies, amber light subsidies, and green light subsidies. Red light
subsidies" are prohibited subsidies. These are considered the most trade
distorting, and are established on the contingencies of export performance,
or the use of domestic goods. Amber light subsidies,3" while not prohibited,
may be actionable under the SCM Agreement. These are specific subsidies,
given to a particular industry, which provoke either injury to a domestic
industry of another member, the nullification of benefits accruing to other
members, or serious prejudice to the interests of another member. Finally,
green light subsidies 39 are nonspecific and fall under the category of
nonactionable subsidies. Among the green lighted subsidies are subsidies in
R&D. Green light subsidies are considered the least trade distorting
subsidies and are not subject to trade action. It is not clear why R&D
subsidies are considered as such. It is conceivable, however, that a patent
acquired via a federal subsidy and subsequently registered in a foreign
country would have the distorting effect of preventing the competition of
other companies from the manufacture or importation of the product,
therefore injuring the domestic industry since the latter would be impeded
from the manufacture of the patented procedure. Some authors argue,

37. Id. art. 3.
38. Id. art. 5.
39. Id. art. 8 (excerpt):
Identification of Non-Actionable Subsidies
8.1 The following subsidies shall be considered as non-actionable:
[8.21 Notwithstanding the provisions of Parts III and V, the following subsidies
shall be non-actionable:
(a) assistance for research activities conducted by firms or by higher education
or research
Establishments on a contract basis with firms if: the assistance covers not more
than 75 per cent of the costs of industrial research or 50 per cent of the costs of
pre-competitive development activity;
and provided that such assistance is limited exclusively to:(i) costs of personnel
(researchers, technicians and other supporting staff employed exclusively in the
research activity); (ii) costs of instruments, equipment, land and buildings used
exclusively and permanently (except when disposed of on a commercial basis)
for the research activity;
(iii) costs of consultancy and equivalent services used exclusively for the research
activity, including bought-in research, technical knowledge, patents, etc.;
(iv) additional overhead costs incurred directly as a result of the research activity;
(v) Other running costs (such as those of materials, supplies and the like),
incurred directly as a result of the research activity.
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however, that such subsidies are indirect and have only faint effects in the
market.4" Article 8.2 indicates that up to 75% of government funding on
basic R&D shallbe nonactionable. For applied or industrial R&D, the cap
is fifty percent. This provision was seen as a victory for industries, which
relied heavily on governmental funding for R&D. As the Congressional
Record points out, the original proposal expressed in the Dunkel text
limited the basic research cap to fifty-percent and the applied research cap
to twenty-five percent. This in turn, would have excluded many ofthe R&D
programs in the United States for being "green lighted." ' During the
Uruguay Round of Negotiations, the Dunkel text was changed. The cap for
basic research was raised to seventy-five percent, while the cap for applied
research (pre-competitive research) was raised to fifty percent. This was
considered a victory for many sectors of the U.S. industry that saw the
original text as a threat to the programs.
The SCM'Agreement in Article 31 states that some of the provisions of
the agreement would be temporary. Among these provisions is Article 8.2,
which deals with subsidies in R&D that were formerly considered
nonactionable. The provision expired at the end of 1999 because the

40. ALAN GUTrERMAN,
International ed., 1997).

INNOVATION AND

COMPETITION POLICY

389 (Kluwer Law

The analysis of restrictions on competition in the context, of research and
development joint ventures is similar to that which must occur when the joint
venture relates to downstream activities, such as production and sales; however,
since research and development is generally materially removed from the market
place for the products of the development work, it may be assumed that the
potential for an appreciable effect in competition will be much less than in other
types ofjoint ventures which involve activities closer to the market.
Id.
41.

The GATT Subsidies Code and its Impact on Research and Development in the US.,

Hearingbefore the Subcommittee on Technology, Environment and Aviation, 103d Cong. (Apr.
21, 1994) (statement of John Gibbons, Dir. of the Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy).
[The] Dunkel text would not have had a similar effect on other countries because
they rely less heavily on central government R&D support and on other
technology policies in support of industry . . . [Before] it was modified, the
Dunkel Text made U.S. programs uniquely exposed to the uncertainties of

countervailing duty actions by our trading partners. This situation led to an urgent
call to renegotiate the R&D language of the subsidies agreement to provide
greater protection for our investments in American industry that have long had
bipartisan support....
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members could not reach an agreement as to its extension. Since its
expiration, subsidies on R&D have become actionable and can be subject
to countervailing duties, or a ruling by a Dispute Settlement Panel to
discontinue such programs. The Canadian government appeared concerned
with the expiration of Article 31, considering the relevance of R&D
subsidies to the new economy, and therefore seemed to support the
continuance of a similar rule excluding R&D from actionability:
In knowledge-based industries, government assistance is often
provided differently than in the old economy. For example, there is
more focus on government-private sector partnerships in R&D, and
assistance comes in forms that are difficult to quantify, such as
transfers of intellectual property. This is true in Canada as well as
elsewhere.
Given this shift, it would be useful to examine whether
new rules are
necessary or desirable to address such assistance."2
Since the lapse of Article 31 in 1999, governmental sponsored R&D
may be subject to countervailing duties and dispute settlement. This appears
plausible as subsidized R&D can have an adverse impact in a particular
country. This was also one of the points of contention between Canada and
Brazil in the WTO. Canada, through its federally sponsored R&D program,
the TCP program, provided grants to enterprises in Canada geared towards
exportation, thereby affecting the ability of EMBRAER to compete
internationally. The WTO Dispute Settlement Panel ruled, and the
Appellant Body confirmed, the TCP program was a prohibited subsidy.43
However strong the impact of such subsidies in other countries, subsidized
R&D has proven to be an effective tool in achieving economic prosperity
balancing interest of the patent holder in enforcing its patent and the nation
that receives this technology, R&D subsidies reduce the reward
justification. The Doha Declaration" issued in November 14, 2001 by the
Ministerial Conference is the topmost body of the WTO. On November 14,
2001, this body issued the Doha Declaration and in turn adopted a position
defended by many developing countries. The body adopted an interest
balancing approach by declaring that nothing in the TRIPS Agreement
denied a country the right to protect the health of its citizens.

42. Department of Finance of Canada, supra note 36.
43. See infraPart IV; see also World Trade Organization, Canada Measures Affecting the
Export ofCivilian Aircraft, AB-1999-2 (WT/DS70/AB/R), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
gen-search.asp (last visited Apr. 16, 2003).
44. WTO Doha Declaration, supra note 6, cl. 4 (After Doha, it is clear that countries can
issue compulsory licenses to address public health crisis such as the AIDS epidemics.).
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V. COMPETING IN THE INFORMATION AGE: WHAT THE

TRIPS AGREEMENT DOES AND DOES NOT Do
While the Code of Conduct on International Technology Transfer failed
to be implemented, developing countries during TRIPS negotiations
successfully voiced their interest in not being limited by the TRIPS
Agreement. They wished to do what other countries had done previously
in order to foster a strong technological base by carving their
responsibilities in the TRIPS Agreement while having their own
developmental needs as a background.
A. Background of the TRIPS Agreement
Before the TRIPS Agreement, a country could not challenge the
substantive patent law of another country under GATT.4 5 Therefore, if a
country felt that it was being unduly burdened in trade with a foreign
country, it would have had to resort to some unilateral measure like Section
301,46 promoting retaliation measures, rather than international
cooperation. In fact, IP was a general exception to the principle of free
trade. In the GATT panel of United States - the panel members concluded
that patent protection was an area in which a member country could take

45. Daniel Gervais, The TRIPSAgreement: DraftAnalysis andHistory,SWEET& MAXWELL
6-9 (1998).
In 1989 report in the case United States - section 337 of the TariffAct of 1930,
the panel made it clear that, in the light of Article XX(d), the substantive patent
law of a contracting party could probably not be challenged under GATT.
However, contracting parties had the obligation to enforce their patent legislation
in a manner that was not inconsistent with GATT provisions. As a result, the
provisions allowing suspension of importation of goods allegedly infringing a
U.S. patent were said to violate GATT because, among other reasons, did not
afford procedural rights of defense under the International Trade Commission,
body which granted the questionable relief.
Id. at 7.
46. Sections 301-3 10 of Trade Act of 1974 devised a scheme that if the U.S. Trade
Representative finds that the United States was being denied its legitimate rights under a trade
agreement by a foreign country, or if it finds that the legislation or practices of a foreign country
unduly burdens U.S. commerce, the Trade Representative may suspend or withdraw from the
application of trade agreements, or impose duties or other restrictions on the imports of the
country which had perpetrated the alleged injury to the extent of the injury to the U.S. commerce.
Trade Act of 1974 § 301.
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measures otherwise not in conformity with their GATT obligations.47 It was
only in the Tokyo Round (1973-1979) that the problem of counterfeited
goods was considered an issue of international trade to be addressed by
GATT.
The TRIPS Agreement, by establishing minimum standards of
protection, was to solve some of these problems and harmonize IP across
the globe. It was first established that the TRIPS Agreement would
approach IP trade to the extent that it affected trade in goods and services
while only clarifying the existing GATT provisions. The negotiations of the
Uruguay Round began in 1986, and by 1987 the negotiations were
polarized to supporters of a far-reaching agreement of IP. At the other side,
developing countries were concerned about overprotection of IP rights4"
and the far-reaching nature of the Agreement. Accordingly, developing
countries tried to argue that the TRIPS Agreement should apply when a
distortion in trade could be proven. Eventually the position defending a farreaching agreement prevailed.
Developing countries, however, put forward their own agenda. The
Group of Developing Countries (Group of Fourteen) used the TRIPS
Agreement to advance concerns over the need of a compulsory license
system in certain cases. In addition, they were concerned over the need49 to
have a technological base of their own, which according to the Group of
Fourteen, should not be prevented, but rather fostered in the TRIPS
Agreement. Throughout the TRIPS Agreement,50 provisions express the
concerns of developing countries that IP rights are not to become a burden
on the development of a country's technological base. The concern by
developing countries is that the TRIPS Agreement becomes a burden to
their development as expressed during the discussion of Article 7.51 In this
discussion, the issue was raised of whether the working requirement of a
patent was a cornerstone of the patent system. More particularly, the issue
was whether working the patented invention in the country of grant was
one of the obligations of the patentee. The spokesperson for the Group of
Fourteen argued that:

47. Gervais, supra note 46, at 6 (citing case L/5333, May 26, 1983).
48. Id. at 7 (citing the Brazilian position, MTN.GNG./NGI l/W/30 (Oct. 31, 1988)).
49. TRIPS pmbl., paras. 5, 6.
50. Gervais, supra note 46, at 37 (notes that preambles are an essential part of GAT'T law.
"Preambles are on occasion relied upon to a considerable extent by panels when the wording of
a provision is not clear or where it is susceptible to divergent interpretations.").
51. TRIPS art. 7; see also supra text accompanying note 7 (stating "balance of national
interests towards IP protection and the promotion of technology").
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such working was an essential element upon which the patent system
was based, and was part of the balance between the interests of
patent owners and those of the country undertaking to protect
inventions... [One] of such abuses was explicitly stated by the Paris
Convention to be failure to work.
In the end, the working requirement could not be agreed upon. Although
in the case of patents, it is arguable whether a working requirement indeed
fosters technological innovation within the granting country. It is true that
patents, in order to be valid, must be capable of being reproduced by a
person with skill in the art. Therefore, if the patent is too vague, or if it
does not carry the right specifications, the patent is void. Nonetheless, a
great deal of information, crucial to the technological innovation, is not
presented in the patent. This is where simple know-how starts.52 One path
that could be undertaken by developing countries would be the creation of
a much stricter, enabling requirement, based on the theory that people of
ordinary skill need more guidance. This threat might create some
willingness to permit working requirements, greater subsidization of
research, or more technical assistance. The Group of Fourteen tried to
prevent this problem by construing the Agreement so not to forbid a
working requirement. After all, the justifications of such a requirement
would be endorsed by the language of Article 7. The Developed Countries
Groups, nonetheless, interprets Article 7 so that it does not conflict with
other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. They argue that Article 27,"

52. See FN Mfg., Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed. cl. 449 (1999) (where FN Manufacturing
argued that U.S. settlement of claim against Colt, in which the government argued that Colt did
not provide enough specifications in its patent of M16 machine guns, was capricious. The
underlying claim was that M1 6 specifications, even if followed by the most rigorous person with
skill in the art could not have provided the dimensions of which certain replacement parts should
be. The only way the information should be acquired was by looking into the manufacturing
process of Colt. This made the replacement parts done after the patent expired incompatible with
the M16 frame. This suit reflected the thin lines between what is know-how, and what is
necessary disclosure to a patent.).
53. TRIPS art. 27.
Patentable Subject Matter: 1. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3,
patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in
all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and
are capable of industrial application. Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65,
paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this Article, patents shall be
available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of
invention, thefield oftechnology and whetherproducts are imported or locally
produced....

2003]
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dealing with patentable subject matter, states that patents shall be granted
without discrimination of whether the patented products are locally
produced or imported. According to those countries, Article 27 is a
prohibition of the working requirement found in certain legislations. In turn,
the United States raised a complaint against Brazil before the WTO. 4
According to the United States, Brazilian Patent Law's Article 68" had a
working requirement that was inconsistent with the obligations under
Articles 27.1 and 28 of the TRIPS Agreement. According to Brazil,56 the
same local working requirement was present under 35 U.S.C. section 204.
This statute required that certain firms, with title to U.S. government
funded inventions, manufacture substantially within the United States,
unless the requirement is waived." The two countries eventually settled and
Brazil committed that before resorting to a compulsory license of a U.S.
patent, it would provide for hearings and consult with the United States.
Considering Brazil's questionable interpretation of Article 27 of the
TRIPS Agreement, it is not clear why the United States settled. It is
Id. (emphasis added).
54. See WTO Complaint by the United States Concerning Brazilian Patent Law,
WT/DS 199/3 (Jan. 9, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Feb. 13, 2003).
55. Free translation of the relevant provision of Article 68 of Law No.

9279 of 1996 reads as follows:

Art. 68 - the patent holder may have its patent compulsorily licensed in case of
abuse in the exercise of rights granted by the patent, or in case of abuse of
economic power achieved through the patent right, to be proved under a court of
law or administrative decision. Section 1: Compulsory license shall be granted
equally: I) in case of non exploration of the object of the patent in the Brazilian
territory for lack of manufacturing or incomplete manufacturing, excepted the
cases of economic infeasibility, where importation will be allowed...
Supporters of the Brazilian law argue that what is forbidden under the TRIPS Agreement is an
absolute working requirement. According to them, the working requirement is not absolute
because the patent holder can prove that it is not economically feasible to install a factory in the
country, the patent holder can have the patented products imported. Brazilian Intellectual Property
Law, No. 9279/96, available at http://wwwt.senado.gov.br/legbras/, in numero box input 9279 and
in Tipo de Norma select lei ordinaria (last visited Apr. 16, 2003) (on file with author).
56. WTO Dispute, Complaint by Brazil Against the United States concerning 35 U.S.C. §
204, WT/DS224/I, Feb. 7, 2001, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gensearch.asp, in
document symbol input WT/DS224/l (last visited Apr. 16, 2003) (on file with author). Although
Brazil did not argue its unlawfulness, the "first to invent" rule applied in IP law of the United
States and may also cause some problematic results as to the recognizance of patentable subject
matter because foreign prior art is not recognized as such. The rule is supported under the
argument that the United States has an interest that foreigners register their patents in the United
States. See also Application of Hans Hilmer, 359 F. 2d 859 (CCPA 1966).
57. 35 U.S.C. § 204.
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possible that the United States did not wish to have its own legislation
concerning working requirements scrutinized since they are indeed present
in most of the innovation procurement legislation. One could also argue
that, at that time, there was an international outcry against abusive practices
of pharmaceutical countries in Africa, which denied the HIV cocktail to
millions of HIV patients in Africa. It would be controversial and maybe
politically unwise to bring a Dispute Panel against Brazil, a country having
substantial positive results in its AIDS program. The Brazilian approach
was innovative and offered evidence contrary to those used by
pharmaceutical countries to deny AIDS drugs in Africa. The pharmaceutical
companies alleged that offering the retrovirus to Africa would put the
world population in danger. They argued that the African population would
likely not comply with prescription requirements while harder and more
dangerous strains of the virus would develop. In Brazil, a program was
administered by the Minister of Health to populations of all incomes while
compliance with the program was substantial."8
As this case may suggest, the interpretation of TRIPS Agreement
provisions are still far from definitive. It is important to balance, within the
TRIPS framework, the interests of IP rights holders with other
considerations. These considerations include public health, the importance
of a strong technological basis for economic prosperity and considerations
outside the TRIPS Agreement. In the case of research subsidies, such
outside considerations include whether patented medicine provokes an
injury to a particular industry. As the dispute between the United States and
Brazil illustrated, there are no clear-cut cases. It is, therefore, essential to
consider the validity of an innovation procurement program with a general
understanding of the underlying goals countries try to achieve. This is valid
when the United States analyzes the legality of a Brazilian working
requirement, as well, as if a given country decides to bring an action against
a national program's subsidizing R&D.

58. Rosenberg, supra note 6.
Brazil was successfully using medicines based on U.S. patents to treat for free
Brazilian patients infected with HIV. They took their medicine properly 80
percent of the time. According to Margaret Chesney, a professor of medicine at
the University of California at San Francisco... this rate is not sufficient to
control the virus - which can kill even people who take their medicine faithfully
- but it is no differentfrom adherence rates in the United States. A study in San
Diegoshowed that 72 percent ofpatients took their medicines 80 percent of the
time.
Id. (emphasis added).

20031

SUBSIDIES CODE, TRIPS AGREEMENT AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

B. FosteringTechnology in Developing Countries:Before and After the
TRIPS Agreement: What ChangedSince the
Draft Code of Conduct in Technology Transfer
During the 1970s, developing countries negotiated the implementation
of a code of conduct in technology transfer situations. 9 These countries,
under the perception that they were invariably denied the full benefits of
technological innovation by multinational companies, sketched a system in
which the transferor of technology had obligations towards the countries.
Such obligations included the prohibition of grant backs and the transfer of
simple know-how after the expiration of underlying patents.
Industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s was perceived in developing
countries as a process of absorbing foreign technology.' This concern
encouraged the screening of foreign technology, allowing it only when it
was compatible with the developmental needs of the country. Countries
could impose restrictions upon repatriation of funds, by regulating anticompetitive measures present in the license agreements of foreign
companies with the government or with domestic industry. The Draft Code
of Conduct was not an isolated act. It was part of the movement in the
United Nations with which developing countries attempted to promote
more balance in the relations between countries and multinationals. That
was seen as the "New International Economic Order." Developed countries
received the international economic order proposal with skepticism, and did
not adhere to these agreements. 6' Therefore, technology transfer
negotiations towards the overall development of a country died out until
the TRIPS Agreement.
In the TRIPS Agreement, developing countries again voiced their
concerns that they could not put the protection of IP rights before their
own national interests for the sake of a strong national technological basis.
Developing countries, for the most part, do not see technology transfer only
in terms of absorption of technology. 62 However, there is still a perception
that more cooperation is needed than what is actually offered. The Group

59. DRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY,
reprintedin INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 15.
60. For example, transfer of new skills to local employees of enterprise; stimulus to local
R&D; diffusion of new technologies throughout the local economy.
61. Except the revision of the Paris Convention in Stockholm.
62. See Bill in the Brazilian Congress (very similar to the Bayh-Dole Act); see also Law No.
10,168, Dec. 29, 2000 (budgetary laws extending the resources to be applied in the scientific
community which instituted a tax to finance research activities of universities).
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of Fourteen was victorious in the sense that the TRIPS Agreement
addresses such concerns in Articles 7, 8,63 40,' and to some extent Article
67.65

There is a great deal of controversy with the interpretation of such
articles. Developed countries interpret the provisions as accepting
63. TRIPS art. 8:
Objectives: 1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and
regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and
to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socioeconomic and technological development, provided that such measures are
consistent with the provisions of the Agreement. 2. Appropriate measures,
provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, may be
needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the
resort to practices that unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the
international transfer of technology.

64. TRIPS art. 40:
Control of Anti-competitive Practices in Contractual Licenses: 1.Members agree
that some licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual property
rights which restrain competition may have adverse effects on trade and may
impede the transfer and dissemination of technology. 2. Nothing in this
Agreement shall prevent Members from specifying in their legislation licensing
practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of
intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the
relevant market. As provided above, a Member may adopt, consistently with the
other provisions of this Agreement, appropriate measures to prevent or control
such practices, which may include for example exclusive grantback conditions,
conditions preventing challenges to validity of coercive package licensing, in the
light of the relevant laws and regulations of that Member...

65. TRIPS art. 67:
In order to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement, developed country
Members shall provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and conditions,
technical and financial cooperation in favor of developing and least-developed
country Members. Such cooperation shall include assistance in the preparation
of laws and regulations on the protection and enforcement of intellectual property
rights as well as on the prevention of their abuse, and shall include support
regarding the establishment of reinforcement of domestic offices and agencies
relevant to these matters, including the training of personnel.
See also Cooperation Agreement Between Brazilian P.T.O. and the European Patent Office,
availableat http://www.inpi.gov.br/noticiasbinpi/200203/mat_5.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
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technological needs of a country as a valid consideration to the extent that
they do not interfere with other rights and provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement.6 6 Under this interpretation, a multinational that carries out
license agreements with developing countries could uphold trade secrets
even after the licensed patents expire. Notwithstanding the high caliber of
scholars that support this interpretation, the agreement does not seem to fit
this interpretation. In all the provisions mentioned before (e.g., Preamble,
Articles, 7, 8, 27, 40, and 67), the TRIPS Agreement strives to balance the
interests of holders of IP rights with the interests of the general public. In
such instances, it is clear that denying protection ofknow-how trade secrets
based on expired patents (therefore leaving it in the public domain) 67 is
more important than having a company continue to explore its own
commercial edge based on an expired patent. Although "TRIPS does not
establish an operational link between the reinforcing ofintellectual property
rights, the promotion of domestic technological development and the
transfer oftechnology, it does nevertheless contain some general statements
about the importance of technological innovation and the role of transfer
of technology in this process. 68
VI. COMPETING IN THE INFORMATION AGE: THE

U.S. EXAMPLE

The Brazilian Congress appears to have acquired a greater sensitivity to
the increasing importance of R&D to the overall welfare of the country. A
bill is currently being discussed in the Brazilian Congress 69 purporting to
deregulate and decentralize R&D in Brazil, aiming to solve the low rate of
innovation. Strong IP rights and government interference in R&D brought
economic prosperity to the United States, and should be a source of
inspiration to Brazil.7 ° The inspiration, however, should not result in an
automatic absorption of the foreign model without critique. With this

66. Gervais, supra note 46, at 68-69, 147-48.

67. We are talking about the protection of know-how as trade secrets after the patent term
that based the license agreements is expired.
68. Roffe & Tesfachew, supra note 2, at 397-99.
69. Projeto de Lei do Senado No. 257, availableat http://legis.senado.gov.br/pls/prodasen/
PRODASEN.LAYOUTMATEDETALHE.SHOWMATERIA?PCODMAT=45957
(last
visited Apr. 18, 2001).
70. I do not mean that the U.S. model does not have its own failures. As I will discuss,
although failures do exist, they are not inherit to the system. Corrections and adaptations to the
Brazilian reality could offer a basis to the pattern of underdevelopment and underutilization of
economic resources that has characterized the Brazilian economy.
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Article, I aim to illustrate the potential pitfalls and drawbacks that such
system may incur.
The U.S. Constitution 7 establishes the basis of the national patent and
copyright system. The U.S. Constitution did not underestimate the
extraordinary utility that technological advancements could offer towards
the development of a new nation. The Copyrights and Patents Clause,
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 accorded the U.S. Congress the right to
"promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries." The power to grant the monopoly is extended
only to the writings and discoveries of authors and inventors. They are
protected to the extent that they promote the science and the useful arts.
The constitutional elements of copyrights and patents is in debate now
inasmuch as it was two hundred years ago. Recently, there was a
constitutional challenge of the Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act,72
which provides for a twenty-year term extension of an otherwise expired
copyright. The relevance of copyright to the constitutional system is still
present as a basic right, within which developmental choices were
embodied. Since the Constitutional Convention, the United States has
structurally changed from an importer of IP to an exporter of IP. This
change reflects the United States' actions in the international arena." From
denying copyrights to foreigners,74 to heavy handed negotiations at
enforcing comparable rights in the WTO, the United States has changed its
policy, in part, to reflect a change in economic conditions.75
The United States offers an interesting example of how a system of IP
protection evolved to adapt to the economic and developmental needs of
the country. Throughout the years, the executive and legislative branches
have arguably tried to devise a system that most efficiently utilizes the
information generated with federal research grants. In the next section, I
will briefly describe the evolution of an innovation procurement system in
the United States, and analyze the points advanced by those who endorse
and who oppose such system.

71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
72. Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a, c), 304 (2003).
73. AUBERT CLARK, THE MOVEMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT IN NINETEENTH
CENTURY AMERICA 22-27 (1960).
74. 4 Stat. 436 (1831), ch. 16, § 8.
75. See William Alford, How Theory Does - And Does Not - Matter: American
Approaches to IntellectualPropertyLaw in EastAsia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 8 (1994) (for an
excellent account of these changes); see also Paul C.B. Liu, U.S. Industry's Influence on
IntellectualPropertyNegotiationsAnd Special301 Actions, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 87 (1994).
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A. An HistoricalOverview: Before andAfter the 1980s
The evolution of the system of patent procurement reflects the tensions
over who should hold title of inventions generated from the money of
taxpayers. The system evolved from an outright refusal of government
inventions being subject to a patent to more appropriative views oscillating
between either government or industry titles.
As a result of the Second World War, President Roosevelt created the
National Patent Planning Commission (Commission).76 Its purpose was to
plan and utilize technology developed during war in times of peace. In its
early report, the Commission presented a view between protecting the
public domain and securing the right of the government to use the
inventions it paid for. Generally, this could be achieved with prompt
publication leading to public domain status. However, the Commission
acknowledged that fostering economic development of the patent required
a patent holding agency to grant an exclusive license to a private party, in
certain cases.77 The Commission nonetheless avoided creating a general rule
of government ownership of patents (title in the government) in conditions
greatly diversified throughout the various national agencies.
In 1947, the Attorney General of the United States, in its report to the
President recommended as a general policy that title of the patent be with
the government in cases of inventions made by government employees or
contractors, subject to few exceptions. The report emphasized public
goods, the fear of concentrating economic power in the hands of big
contractors, and a general dislike towards private appropriation of taxgenerated research. In the 1940s, a debate ensued between title policy and
license policy. Rebecca Eisenberg notes,78 however, that this debate
disregarded a third alternative, which was to keep the innovation in the
public domain. Although the U.S. Congress did not follow the general
provisions ofthe Commission, it did enact certain policies advanced also by
the Commission.
In 1963, the Kennedy administration issued a Presidential Memorandum
and Policy Statement to find some a balance between the opposing views
of title versus license. The memorandum suggested conditions upon title be
granted to the government or to the contractor and was based on studies
by agencies of science and technology. For example, when contract
research builds upon existing technology, title should be left to the

76. Rebecca Eisenberg, PublicResearchandPrivateDevelopment: Patentsand Technology
Transfer in Government-SponsoredResearch, 82 VA. L. REv. 1663, 1671 (1996).
77.. Id. at 1672.
78. Id. at 1674.

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW& POLICY

[Vol. 8

contractor with technical competence and a commercial position in the
field. In addition, the title should be subject to a non-exclusive royalty free
license to the government. The government also retained march-in rights in
case the contractor failed to bring the application to commercial viability
within three years. The Presidential Memorandum did not bring the desired
uniformity throughout federal agencies. However, it did lead to further
study and the establishment of a Committee on Government Patent Policy,
which commissioned a study of government patent policy to the Harbridge
House.
The Harbridge House Report (Harbridge Report) was devised to
investigate the effects of patent policy (title versus license) on industry
participation in government sponsored R&D programs.79 The Harbridge
Report stated that only 12.4% of inventions that were patented within 1957
and 1962 had been put to use. Among the contractors with prior experience
on the field of invention, the Harbridge Report found that 23.8% of
invention titles belonging to contractors with prior experience in the field
of the invention had some commercial utilization. When the title belonged
to the government, the percentage dropped to 13.3%. Eisenberg notes that
although these figures may suggest better utilization of inventions whose
title belongs to the contractor, the numbers are inconclusive. Within the
sample of inventions, 83% were sponsored by the Department of Defense,
which already had a policy allowing for contractor titles. The Harbridge
Report made no conclusions, but affirmed that there was no evidence
indicating a best way to achieve the utilization of inventions sponsored by
federal money. The authors of the Harbridge Report expressed that the
market potential by itself was insufficient to bring about patent utilization
in certain areas, like pharmaceuticals.
As a result of the Harbridge Report, President Nixon issued a
Presidential Memorandum, in 1971, where he suggested changes to the
Memorandum and Policy Statement on Government Patent Policy by
making it easier for private firms to acquire exclusive rights to governmentsponsored inventions. The Presidential Memorandum also included
provisions granting march-in rights, compelling contractors to grant
exclusive and non-exclusive rights. Such concerns were embodied in the
Domestic Policy Review on Industrial Innovation, which was led by
President Carter, and which intended to increase industrial productivity and
innovation. President Carter announced his support to the U.S. Congress,
in 1979, of a uniform government patent policy with the aim of promoting
industrial innovation. The original proposal was to allow universities and

79. Id. at 1681.
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small business contractors to retain patent ownership in government
sponsored research, and exclusive licenses to other contractors in specific
cases. This proposal drew opposition from industry trade groups, who also
wanted a piece of the cake.
The Bayh-Dole Act focused exclusively on the part of small businesses
and universities. The supporters of the bill argued that including large
businesses would result in the bill's defeat by consumer advocates and
antitrust lawyers. Accordingly, the bill was passed by the U.S. Congress
with no provisions for big contractors. This did not mean that they could
not exploit inventions born in cooperative research. They were often able
to explore comparable rights under the general administrative policy of the
various agencies.8 °
The Bayh-Dole Act triggered the reconsideration of prospective basis
waivers, which Institutional Patent Agreements granted to universities. This
reconsideration limited the agency's ability to control the availability and
cost of such inventions. Under these previous Institutional Patent
Agreements, universities seeking to appropriate and license patents did not
need to request such authorization on a case-by-case basis. The Bayh-Dole
Act put the uncertainties of universities and small contractors to an end.
Supporters of the Bayh-Dole Act point to statistical evidence in the
Harbridge Report in which the government failed to provide for the
commercial exploitation of patents. Among the patents held by the
government (30,000 total), only 325 were commercially exploited.
Eisenberg argues, however, that the statistical data in the Harbridge Report
was not sound because it reflected only one type of invention. Eisenberg
notes that the majority of these patents emerged from Department of
Defense agreements which already granted title to the contractor.
Furthermore, contractors did not see any commercial future in government
patents. Eisenberg points out that among the patents of the Department of
Health (325), 23% of those with no general policy of title in the contractor,
were exploited commercially.
The original justification advanced by the Bayh-Dole Act to grant patent
rights to small contractors was their ability to commercially exploit the
invention. Anotherjustification was their familiarity with research results.
Justification for universities was a little different. Although one of the
justifications was the close relationship between the invention and the
inventor, the basic justification was geared towards a better exploitation of
patents than that of the government.

80. Id. at 1693-94.
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Since its passage in 1980, the Bayh-Dole Act 8 ' has been considered a
great success in stimulating the commercial development of discoveries
funded by government funds. By encouraging the patenting of inventions
that otherwise would be freely disseminated (and appropriated), the BayhDole Act redistributes 82 some gains from innovation back upstream. This
charges the firms that develop commercial products, and rewards both
universities and agencies. In contrast, a negative consequence 83 to the
Bayh-Dole Act in the university setting is the pressure that universities now
put on the Patent Office to recognize basic research as patentable.
Eisenberg notes that as public research becomes more appropriable, it
becomes more difficult tojustify. It may also divert the focus of universities
from teaching knowledge to commercialization. 4 Another criticism of the
Bayh-Dole Act was advanced by some members of the U.S. Congress who
saw a situation in which the "government pays the cost of digging the mine,
the contractor gets the gold, and the taxpayer gets the [shaft.]"8 5
The devised system was not completed in the Bayh-Dole Act. President
Reagan, in an executive order 6 implementing the Federal Technology
Transfer Act (FTT Act), granted lab directors the decision to allow the
contractor to keep the patent. While the input side of federal technology
transfer is covered by the Bayh-Dole Act, the Stevenson-Wydler
Technology Transfer Act (Stevenson-Wydler Act) deals mostly with the
output side. The policy consideration behind the Stevenson-Wydler Act
was the understanding that agencies should ensure the full use ofthe results
of the federal investment and R&D of the nation. Statutes that later altered
the Stevenson-Wydler Act were the FTT Act, the Executive Order 12591
implementing the FTT Act, the National Competitiveness Act of 1991, and
the American Technology Preeminence Act of 1991.87

81. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 202 (relevant Bayh-Dole Act provisions are incorporated); see also 15
U.S.C. § 3710d (1994).
82. Eisenberg, supra note 77, at 1712.
83. Id. at 1726.
84. Lawrence Rudolph, Overview ofFederalTechnology Transfer,5 RISK 133, 135 (1994).
85. Id.
86. Exec. Order No. 12,591, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,414 (Apr. 10, 1987). See Gov't Cont. Under
F. Acquisition Reg. 35.5 (2d ed.) WL 52 FR 13414 (The Executive Order mandated agencies to
treat all contractors (big and small) equally, to the extent the law allowed so.) Both the FTT Act
and the National Competitiveness Technology Transfer Act extended the scope of the laws to
allow national laboratories (government owned and operated, and some government owned,
contractor operated) the same regime granted to agencies. Id..
87. While agencies directed by the FTT Act to allow employed inventors to patent
inventions if agencies do not intend to do so, the Executive Order mandated agencies to treat all
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There are several bills in the U.S. Congress that deal with technology
transfer. They all acknowledge that federal technology transfer is a pillar to
the U.S. economy.88 This policy seems to have achieved positive results.
Since its implementation, the United States has provided the world with a
large share of all inventions in the world.89
B. The Shift in the US. InternationalPosition:
Impact of HistoricalChanges
The Framers ofthe U.S. Constitution attached considerable importance
to the country's potential to establish its own technological basis and to
evolve from being a country of IP importers to a country of IP exporters.
The U.S. Constitution authorizes the U.S. Congress to promote the
progress of the sciences and the useful arts. This is performed by securing
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries for a limited time. In 1790, the first Copyright Act9" was passed
to grant (citizen or resident) authors a fourteen-year copyright. In 1831, the
statute9' was revised mainly to increase the term of years, from fourteen to
twenty-eight, with the possibility of a fourteen-year renewal granted to the

contractors (big and small) equally, to the extent the law allowed so. Exec. Order No. 12,591, 52
Fed. Reg. 13,414 (Apr. 10, 1987).
88. National Competitiveness Act, H.R. 820, 103d Cong. (1993) (one of the Acts that had
the major goal to foster an advanced manufacturing program to help U.S. firms to compete in the
international market); see generally S. Rep. No. 103-113 (1993).
[S]upporting the goal of the Bill to promote the industrial competitiveness and
economic growth of the United States by strengthening and expanding the
civilian technology programs of the Department of Commerce, to enhance the
development and nationwide deployment of manufacturing technologies and
authorizing appropriations for the Technology Administration of the Department
of Commerce.
See also The National Competitiveness Act of 1993, on H.R 820 Before the House Comm. On
Science, Space and Technology, 103d Cong., CIS-NO: 93-H701-53 (1993) (statement of Ernest
Daman, David Mertes granting support for H.R. 820) (stressing need for Federal programs to
promote U.S. competitiveness in manufacturing technology; reviewing of various Federal
programs for collecting data on foreign science and technology, with views on potential usefulness
to U.S. businesses).
89. RYAN, supra note 34, at 2 (1998). Ryan points out that in 1992 around 45% of all
industrial R&D in the industrialized countries was carried out in the United States, and that U.S.based inventors earned about 45% of patents granted by the U.S.P.T.O. and 25% of the European
Patent Office. Id.
90. 1 U.S. Stat. 124 (1790).
91. 4 U.S. Stat. 436 (1831).
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author, widow, or children. This statute also denied foreign authors any
protection. Aubert Clark explains that among the reasons for such a unique
position in comparison to major European countries, were 1) the everincreasing literate public; 2) the even faster increasing business of book
manufacturing; 3) the lack of developing any literature of its own; 4) and
one common language. 92
The U.S. policy changed by first allowing protection to foreigners and
second by demanding aggressive protection to U.S. works in countries that
traditionally did not enforce or even have copyright laws. 93 The United
States signed the Berne Convention94 only in 1988, exactly one hundred
and twenty years after the convention first concluded. Among the reasons
for implementing the Berne Convention was the rapidly expanding trade in
goods. Therefore, domestic industries relying on copyright protection that
produce trade surpluses for the United States should be protected. Another
factor was that U.S. popular culture had become a precious export
commodity of immense economic value. Such values had become unduly
eroded by a system with low copyright standards.95
After first refusing to sign the Berne Convention, and imposing national
working requirements for copyrights of books to later leading the
negotiations of the TRIPS Agreement, the United States has come a long
way. The economic explanations for these changes are various. The United
States was no longer geared primarily towards manufacturing physical
goods. One reflection of that is the recent drop in U.S. Steel giving Walt
Disney a place among one of the thirty industrial stocks representing U.S.
commerce. Why did this change take place? In part because it is very hard
to compete with the cheap labor of developing countries, and in part to
solving the U.S. balance of payments. Thomas McCarthy makes the point
that "if foreign nations do not recognize or enforce intellectual property
laws, then America has nothing to sell...,,9
The International Trade Commission placed the U.S. cost of piracy of
IP for selected industries at more than $60 billion per year. This is an
amount close to the trade of the United States with the entire world in
1992. The amount is clearly inflated because it does not take into
consideration different salaries within different countries, and the

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

CLARK, supra note 74, at 27.
Alford, supra note 76, at 12-24.
Berne Convention, supra note 8.
Berne Convention Implementation Act, H.R. REP. No. 609, 100th Cong., 11-20 (1988).
McCarthy, supra note 12, at 814.
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price/value that one attaches to IP varies from country to country.97
Nonetheless, it is undeniable how increasingly important IP is for the U.S.
economy. 98 For this reason, the United States developed its policies around
a stronger IP protection internationally." Its views were many times
accepted under arguable duress. Chinese representatives complained before
the WTO that the United States was in fact blackmailing China and Taiwan
to grant IP protection to U.S. goods, using access to U.S. markets as a
bargaining chip."°
This was in synchrony with the U.S. foreign policy position within the
WTO Uruguay Round of Negotiations. The United States would not grant
most favored nation treatment to countries that did not sign the TRIPS
Agreement."°' The critics ofthe placement of the TRIPS Agreement within
the WTO framework argued that the main purpose of the WTO was to
provide free trade of goods and services, and to reduce the barriers of
trade.'°2 Nonetheless, the U.S. position was a victorious one in the Uruguay
Round of Negotiations. However, the United States has recently had to

97. Wiliam Alford, Intellectual Property,Trade and Taiwan: A GATT-Fly's View, 1992

COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 97, 99 (1992) (Alford argues that it is unlikely that a young academic in
Shanghai whose monthly salary is approximately $50.00 will be willing to pay $35.00 for a U.S.
law book, no matter how useful the book might be.).
98. S.K. Verma, The TRIPSAgreementandDevelopment,in INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER: THE ORIGINS AND AFTERMATH OF THE UNITED NATIONS NEGOTIATIONS ON A DRAFT

CODE OF CONDUCT 323 (Surendra J. Patel et al. eds., 2000). Verma notes that:
it had been estimated that in five leading developed countries, foreign trade in
technology grew about U.S.D 2.7 billion in the mid-1960s to over U.S.D 17
billion at the end of the 1970s, and the net balance of this trade from about U.S.D

1.1 billion to U.S.D 6.0 billion in the same period. The developing countries are
an increasingly important market in this trade.
99. It is interesting to note that the United States did not sign the first attempt to have an
international body of trade dispute settlement. The ITO (Havana Charter) was not accepted by the
United States probably because of a concern of loss of sovereignty. Gervais, supra note 46, at 4.
100. Alford, supra note 76, at 100 (citing Winkler, U.S.-Taiwan Trade Talks, IP ASIA, Sept.

13. 1990).
101. Id. at 23; see also J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual
Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L LAW. 345,
347-51 (1995).
102. Trips Agreement, supra note 5, pmbl. The concern addressed by developing countries
was embodied in the preamble of the TRIPS Agreement: "and to ensure that measures and
proceduresto enforce intellectualpropertyrightsdo not themselves become barriersto legitimate
trade."
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retreat from its unpopular position in the area of public health.' i3 The Doha
Round embodied the concerns of developing countries, who did not want
to be constrained by IP in the face of public health necessities.

VII. PUTING THE BRAZILIAN.BILL, LEI DE INOVA4AO, IN
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

The development of the United States' innovation policy was mainly
geared towards fostering the commercial application of scientific
innovation. In order to do this, the system evolved from a policy where the
government had an unconditional title ofthe patent, to a policy in which the
private initiative and universities were granted rights and duties to pursue
commercialization.' 04 Notwithstanding the criticisms that such policy has
received internally,0 5 it is certainly true that the policy of empowering the

103. Rachel L. Swarns, Aids DrugDeal Expected in South Africa Suit, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 19,
2001, World Section (The United States tried to forbid South Africa from acquiring generic
medicines based on U.S. patents, but the fight proved too be much controversial and unpopular,
and the U.S. pharmaceutical industries decided to drop their claims. Interestingly, the United
States seems to have adopted the position it tried to curb when it threatened "march-in" rights for
the prescription of the antibiotic Cypro, used in the treatment of Anthrax.); see ABA Comm. on
Research and Development and Intellectual Property Minutes (Nov. 15, 2001), available at
http://www.abanet.org/contract/federal/randcomm/minutes/nov 152001 min.html (last visited Mar.
6, 2003).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (the "authorization and consent statute"), the
Government may authorize a contractor to use a patent to which the U.S. has no
rights (march-in rights). The patent holder's sole remedy lies in the U.S. Court
of Federal Claims for a reasonable royalty; this amounts to compulsory licensing.
[The] Government had threatened to invoke 10 U.S.C. § 1498 in favor of
competitors in attempting to secure a reasonable price from Bayer Corporation
for Cypro. At least until December 2003, Bayer is the sole patent holder for the
anthrax antibiotic. . . . [That] the concept of Government interest operates
differently from that of the financial world; it is hard to prove reluctance of
companies to take part in Government R&D. Harvey Nathan and Will Anderson
reported that as of yet there was no official Government position on the Bayh
Dole Act; they believed, however, that it would favor greater flexibility.
Id.
104. Eisenberg, supra note 77, at 1709-15.
105. There is an ever-growing literature against government interference in R&D. Eisenberg
argues that "by allowing private firms to hold exclusive rights to inventions that have been
generated at public expense, it seems to require the public to pay twice for the same invention once through taxes to support research [and] then again through higher monopoly prices..." See
Eisenberg, supra note 77 at 1666; see also Aoki, supra note 18, at 42 (discussing the private

2003]
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universities and private companies with the responsibility of R&D has
brought overall positive results to the United States and to other countries
that adopt such policies. A recent research study sponsored by UNESCO
found a strong correlation between social and economic development and
investment in R&D. Among the richest countries and regions (United
States, Japan, Europe, and Australia), the investment in R&D is around 1.8
percent of the GDP; the per capita income in those countries is around
$20,000. In Latin American countries, R&D investment is generally not
more than 0.7 percent of the GDP while the per capita income is about
$5,000.'06 The increasing importance of R&D to the overall welfare of the
country was recognized by the Brazilian Legislature last year when Senator
Roberto Freire °7 proposed a bill deregulating and decentralizing R&D in
Brazil.
The bill tries to solve low rate of innovation in Brazilian industry
notwithstanding the great potential Brazilian scientists have demonstrated
in the past and present.'08 To illustrate the type of problem that the bill
proposes to correct, we offer the example of the case of the jararaca
venom. In 1965, Sdrgio Ferreira, from Universidade de Sao Paulo (USP)
was researching the venom of the Jararaca, a type of snake endemic of

appropriation of the public domain in Western countries with the ever increasing IPprotection and
analogizing with the tragedy of commons, where nobody owns, therefore nobody cares); see also
Richard Shelby, Accountabilityand Transparency:Public Access to FederallyFundedResearch
Data, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369 (2000) (arguing for more transparency of research data,
principally where such data is the basis of legislation. The EPA ordered a study on ozone and
particulate matter. Based on the study, a proposal was made to the U.S. Congress that would
implicate over $5-8 billion in regulatory burdening. Senator Shelby criticized that neither the EPA
nor the Congressman had access to such data in which the proposed legislation was based.).
106. UNESCO Dossier, available at http://www.unesco.org/courier/1999_05/uk/dossier/
intro25.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2003).

107. Roberto Freire is a senator from Pernambuco, a Brazilian Northeastern state. He was
until 1991 the president of PCB, The Brazilian Communist Party. In 1991, under the leadership
of Freire the party changed its name and most of its policies because of the failure of the
communist regimes in the ex-USSR. Freire is a consensus in the Brazilian Congress, recognized
by all the parties as an example. His prestige brought him the highly desired position of leader of

government in the Brazilian Congress, notwithstanding his membership to a different party of that
of the president.Senador Roberto Freire Web Site, available at http://www.senado.gov.br/web/
senador/rfreire/default.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2003); Outras Informacoes, available at
httpJi/www.senado.gov.br/web/senador/rfreire/outrasinformacoes.html (last visited Apr. 4,2003).
108. Brazil, for example, was the first country to map a plant pathogen. See Ricardo
Bonalumd, Brazil to Sequence "FirstPlant Pathogen," 389 NATURE 654 (1997); Cf Thomas
Prolla, When BraziliansAchieve, It's Against All the Odds, 406 NATURE 826 (2000) (letter by a

Brazilian scientist arguing that the Brazilian universities suffer from a bureaucratic regime,
underpaid professionals, and they are underfunded, which make any attempt to excel a game
against the odds).
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Brazil, and discovered and isolated a substance in the venom which
provoked a sudden drop of blood pressure among people bitten by the
snake. The venom of the Jararaca was capable of intensifying the response
to bradicinine.09 The experiment was further pursued by the research group
Wellcome Labs, and gave origin to a wide array of anti-hypertensive
medicines, among them Capoten, which yields a business of $4 billion a
year.
The Brazilian Bill carries similarities with the Bayh-Dole Act. The main
features of the bill are the possibility of scientists, investigators, and small
companies to be awarded title or royalties from the product of the
invention. The bill also provides for systems of partnership between
universities and private industry. It further provides benefitted tax treatment
for small companies which carry out R&D activities."' The bill provides for
greater flexibility in terms of employment relationships between researchers
and institutions of higher education.
The bill cannot be understood in a vacuum. Complementing legislation
has already been implemented. The Brazilian Law No. 10,168..' of
December 20, 2000 establishes a tax whose sole purpose is to fund
programs of technological innovation which in turn foster interactions
between universities and private industry. The tax falls under juridical
entities that have tech transfer license agreements with foreign entities. The
contribution is going to be ten percent of the total contract price. In 2002,
the government expects to collect over R $192 million, or about U.S. $56.4

109. Sdrgio Ferreira and his team discovered in an experiment that the jararaca's venom was
capable of intensifying the response to bradicinine. They denominated FPF the bradicinine
potentiation factor. The venom had a peptide inhibitor of the enzyme conversor of angiotensin I
and II, which were the same enzymes that degrade bradicine. After his discovery, many other
peptides were synthesized. The first one was the teprotide. In 1977 Cushman and his team came
to the captropil, the beginning of a therapeutical field that started in Ribeirdo Preto, with Sdrgio
Ferreira (information extracted from Sociedade Brasileira de Cardiologia Web site), availableat
http://www.cardiol.br/conheca/caminhos/01/5.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2003).
110. Embodied in the provision is the hope that the private initiative in the long run will take
over the participation now financed by the federal government. In the United States, the shift has
already been perceived. Over 60 percent of research is privately sponsored. In Brazil, companies
are still in their first steps, but there are some examples of success. The Laboratory Cristalia, a
private laboratory, in the state of Sao Paulo, was asked by the USP (U.S. Pharmacopoeia) to
provide the standard models of production of the active ingredient sufentanil citrate. See Mauricio
Capela, CristaliaObtem Reconhecimento nos EUA, Valor Economico No. 457, Mar. 1, 2002 (on
file with author).
I 11. This law has established the popularly called "Fundo Verde-Amarelo" (Green-Yellow
Fund).
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million" 2 based on a new tax to be distributed among governmental R&D
programs.113
Although the sums are still incipient in light of current national R&D
needs, the Brazilian government appears to finally acknowledge the
economic relevance of technology and innovation to the overall welfare of
the nation. Its policies and participation, domestically and internationally," 4
show a concomitant commitment to IP protection. They intend to strike a
balance of interests to IP holders, and to foster technological innovation in
Brazil. The TRIPS Agreement has been implemented through the new law
of Patents (Law No. 9,279 of May 14,1996), where Article 27 of the
TRIPS Agreement was construed so to foster technological innovation. The
other previously discussed laws show a tendency to shift the economic
profile of Brazil to that of a pure importer of technology." 5
The new Brazilian momentum towards innovation appears to be a great
step in achieving independence and economic prosperity. These are the
same qualities the United States looked for in the 1980s when it devised its
system of innovation procurement to foster commercial application of
innovations. Whether this policy will resist political oscillations in Brazil is
not yet known.
VIII. CONCLUSION

In reason of the expiration of Article 31 -whichgives provisional validity
to Articles 8 and 9 of the SCM Agreement that treats R&D as a green light
subsidy, since 1999 R&D subsidies may be actionable under the WTO,
depending upon the findings of injury to domestic industries. Article 8.2,
however, cannot be taken out of context from the WTO framework.
Equally so, Brazilian Law No. 10332 has to be understood within the whole
framework of WTO. One may conclude that because this law promotes the

112. FINEP Web site, availableat http://www.finep.gov.br/ (last visited May 1, 2003).
113.

Brazilian Law No. 10332, art. 1, Dec. 19, 2001, available at http://www.finep.gov.br/

clipping/meio&imagemlu 13552.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
114. Carta de Genebra, Feb. 2002 (Statement of Position by the Brazilian Mission in the
Doha Round, very similar to the final resolution), availableat http://www.mre.gov.br (last visited
Apr. 16, 2003) (portuguese).
115. See Darlene Menconi & Sonia Filgueiras, Caldeirdo da pajelanqa, ISTOt ONLINE

MAGAZINE, Sept. 19, 2001, available at http://www.terra.com.br/istoe/l668/ciencia/1668_
caldeirao pajelanca2.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2003) (portuguese) (presenting data that Brazil
spent from 1989 to 2001 $11.6 billion for the use of technologies and marks developed and
patented overseas. At the same time Brazil sold only $2.8 billion of products embodying
exclusively Brazilian technology).

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LA W & POLICY

[Vol. 8

financing and dividing of R&D subsidies among different industries, it is
potentially in conflict with Article 3 of the SCM Agreement. This in turn
creates an injury to the domestic industry of other members. The TRIPS
Agreement, however, by granting deference and leeway to countries for the
pursuit of their developmental needs," 6 may act as a counterweight of the
prohibition laid out in the SCM Agreement.
Article 1 of Brazilian Law 10332 provides that 7.5% of all tax revenues
from the tax created by Law No. 10168 will go to the R&D necessary for
the aircraft industry. Is Law No. 10168, which is the Brazilian version of
the TCP found illegal by the WTO? 7 It is hard to have a clear-cut answer
to this problem, since 1) when the decision was rendered Article 8.2 of the
SCM Agreement was still in force, and 2) Canada did not and does not
receive the benefit of Article 27.4 granting special benefits for developing
countries. I would argue that the requirement of fostering developmental
needs of members and the exception of the SCM Agreement for developing
countries favor a positive interpretation of Law No. 10332.
Although governmental subsidies to R&D activities appear to foster
economic prosperity and promote wealth to the country adopting a policy
of innovation procurement through governmental subsidies, other
considerations should also play a role when one particular country decides
to adopt such subsidies. For example, a subsidy may weaken the argument
that a patent should be protected in order to foster further R&D. Another
consideration is that in the area ofpharmaceuticals. The example of patents
acquired through governmental grants and later enforced against foreign
countries without conditions to buy the patented product demonstrates the
discrepancy and the potential unfair results to which such policies can lead.
Notwithstanding, I argue that governmental participation in the national
R&D efforts is a legitimate way for a country to achieve the technological
independence needed for economic development and prosperity.
Accordingly, the role of government R&D should diminish, as national
industries take a leading role in sponsoring innovation. This is precisely the
case in the United States today, where governmental participation has been

116. See TRIPS pmbl., arts. 7,8,40,67 (The Brazilian Bill clearly grants more flexibility and
encourages partnership between small to mid sized companies and universities in the R&D
process.).
117. Department of Foreign Affairs, supra note 28.
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decreasing,"8 while private participation has been dramatically increasing
in the past decade." 9

118. National Science Foundation, supra note 32.
119. National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Studies, U.S. Industrial
R&D PerformersReport IncreasedR&Din 1998 (showing that between 1997 and 1998 industrial
R&D performed by private industries raised 9 percent, whereas federal funding R&D stayed
leveled), available at http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/databrf/sdb00320.htm (last visited Mar. 18,
2003); see also National Science Foundation, supra note 32.

